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Abstract:​​ In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial 
network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to 
gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the 
epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two 
studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is 
almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the 
accounts engaging with this topic are pro-vaccine, while the other half are con-vaccine. We also 
show that these two camps rarely engage with one another, and that the con-vaccine camp has 
greater epistemic reach and receptivity than the pro-vaccine camp. In light of these findings, we 
question whether testimonial networks as they are currently constituted on popular fora such as 
Twitter are living up to their promise of delivering the wisdom of crowds. We conclude by 
pointing to directions for further research in digital social epistemology. 
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1. Introduction  1
One of the central ways people gain knowledge is through the testimony of others. Despite this, 
the epistemology of testimony has made modest progress in addressing its inherently social 
components. The paradigm case of testimony in the philosophical literature consists of the 
transmission of knowledge from ​exactly one​ person to ​exactly​ ​one​ other person, neglecting 
proximal and (even more so) distal social sources of knowledge.  
Only recently have philosophers moved beyond the hearer-speaker dyad. For example, in 
epistemology some have considered what it means for ​groups ​to testify (Tollefsen 2007; Lackey 
2015, 2018). In the philosophy of science, others have started to explore which network 
structures are conducive to sharing knowledge within ideal communities of scientific researchers 
(Holman and Bruner 2015; Rosenstock et al. 2016; Zollman 2007, 2010). Still lacking is an 
evaluation of testimonial networks consisting of both experts and non-experts in non-ideal 
settings. In philosophy, Coady (1992) briefly considers the influence of network structure on the 
transmission of historical knowledge. However, he does not identify formal network features or 
structures that are likely to produce epistemic goods and avoid epistemic ills. In sociology, 
Senturk (2005) addresses the structure of the ​hadith​ transmission network from Muhammad’s 
contemporaries to subsequent generations; this is arguably the longest extant intergenerational 
testimonial network of its sort, spanning 610 CE to 1505 CE. Senturk shows that participants in 
this network, known as ​huffaz​ (roughly “ones who memorize and protect” ​ahadith​), aimed to 
learn ​ahadith​ from other ​huffaz​ with the shortest paths back to the prophet and his companions. 
In the terminology we use below, this means that the ​huffaz​ saw themselves as playing the role of 
epistemic conduits, and that they attempted to minimize the length of epistemic geodesics in the 
hadith​ transmission network. Minimizing geodesics is an epistemic strategy that can be formally 
modelled, but do modern advances suggest more epistemically promising strategies? In this 
paper, we seek to make progress on this front. In particular, we are interested in identifying good 
sources and receivers of information based on the surrounding network structures of their 
epistemic community. 
Consider a typical search engine. After a user enters a query, a series of links to presumed 
answers to the query are ranked and displayed to the user. There are several underlying 
mechanisms that give rise to the resulting list. Some of these mechanisms are inherently 
networked and constitute a link-based ranking. It is the interconnection among the links that 
helps determine which ones are displayed first. PageRank, developed by one of Google’s 
founders, is one of these networked mechanisms (Brin & Page 1998). Importantly, one of the 
motivations behind PageRank is its epistemic benefits. The underlying assumption is that groups 
of individuals can be more reliable and converge on true answers more so than individuals acting 
in isolation. Following Masterson et al. (2017), we refer to this assumption as the 
1 This publication was supported by a subaward agreement from the University of Connecticut with funds provided 
by Grant No. 58942 from John Templeton Foundation. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the official views of UConn or John Templeton Foundation.  
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wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis​.  One of the distinguishing features of PageRank and algorithms 2
like it is that, instead of determining rank solely based on the number of incoming links, it 
accounts for the ​importance ​of those links. For example, if a well-connected news source links to 
a particular webpage, that link is given higher weight than a link to the same webpage from an 
obscure blog. Such a ranking system has the potential to track epistemic importance. In fact, 
Masterton et al. (2016, 2017) have shown that PageRank can deliver epistemic benefits and 
justify a wisdom of crowds thesis, albeit in artificial or ideal cases. 
There are many similarities between a large testimonial network and a network of 
webpages. Like webpages, individuals share novel information. Individuals also decide to share 
information with others by posting or linking to it. Thus, we can ask whether ranking individuals 
based on formal properties of their information-sharing network is truth-tracking or justifies a 
wisdom of crowds thesis of testimony. More precisely, can PageRank identify good sources of 
information and well-informed receivers of information in a testimonial network? 
In order to shed light on this question and test the related wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis, 
we conducted two case studies involving non-ideal epistemic communities. Both studies involve 
discussions of vaccine safety on Twitter. The results of these studies indicate that, in non-ideal 
cases, PageRank is sufficient neither for identifying individuals who are good sources of 
information nor for identifying individuals who are likely to be well-informed receivers. We 
conclude by arguing that, in testimonial networks, considerations of source independence and 
source diversity are needed to give a fuller picture of the network-structures conducive to 
knowledge transmission. 
In what follows, we first expound on the nature of networks, especially how they can 
help answer epistemological questions by harnessing the wisdom of crowds. In sections 3 and 4 
we describe our two case studies. We end with a discussion of our results and point to areas of 
future research for both philosophers and graph theorists. 
 
2. Networks, epistemology, and PageRank 
A network or graph is an abstract mathematical object. The simplest networks represent nothing 
beyond the bare presence of nodes and whether, for each pair of nodes, there exists a connection 
between them. Connections between nodes can be directed or undirected. In an undirected 
network the connections between the nodes (edges) represent a bidirectional relationship. A 
network of connected cities is an example of a undirected network: the cities are the nodes and 
the highways or interstates are the edges that connect them. In a ​directed ​network, by contrast, 
each edge is  unidirectional. A network showing the flow of money to politicians from campaign 
funders is an example of a directed network. Individual politicians and campaign contributors are 
the nodes, and the flow of money is represented by directed edges connecting the nodes. In this 
toy example, the direction of the edges is always ​from ​the campaign contributors ​to ​the 
politicians. Moreover, edges can be ​weighted​. The weight of an edge indicates the varying 
strength of an edge. In a campaign contributions network, edge weights could represent how 
much money each contributor gives to a particular politician. The research question and the 
target phenomenon dictate how modelers determine which network parameters, such as edge 
weights and directions, to use. 
2 Wisdom-of-crowds hypotheses are not unique to the web. They also underlie arguments for the epistemic value of 
democracy (List and Goodin 2001), the epistemic value of juries (Hedden 2017), and crowd wisdom more generally 
(Surowiecki 2004).  
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As mentioned above, in this paper we are interested in identifying good sources and 
receivers of information based on the surrounding structures of their testimonial network. In 
order to successfully model such a testimonial community we need to get clear on what the 
appropriate network structure is for our target phenomenon. In the remainder of this section, we 
discuss important testimonial concepts (2.1), their operationalization in a network (2.2), and the 
wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis regarding how to rank individuals within a network (2.3).  In what 3
follows, “testimonial community” refers to the target phenomenon and “testimonial network” 
refers to the network-model of the community. 
2.1 Testimonial concepts  4
In a community, an epistemic agent can play one or more roles. They can be a primary ​source​ of 
knowledge for others. Alternatively, they can ​receive​ knowledge from others. Additionally, they 
can act as a ​conduit​ who passes along knowledge from a primary source (or another conduit) to a 
receiver (or another conduit). An agent is a powerful epistemic source if their messages are likely 
to be transmitted to others in the network. Likewise, an agent is a well-positioned receiver if 
messages in the network are likely to be transmitted to them. And an agent is a powerful conduit 
if they have the ability to control whether and which messages originated by others propagate 
through the network. In this paper, we focus primarily on sources and receivers, leaving conduits 
to future research.  
In each case of testimonial exchange, there is a single ​testifies-to​ relation that originates 
from the source to the receiver. The testifies-to relation between one source and one receiver has 
been explored in great depth in social epistemology. Considerations of trust, reliability, social 
power, and expertise are all present in a single case of testimony (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013). 
However, most discussions focus on whether one isolated source is trustworthy, reliable, or has 
power over the receiver, and how these considerations reflect on epistemic norms or virtues. 
Importantly, there are macro-level aspects to testimonial trust, power, and source reliability that 
are sure to be ignored, if we focus only on ​one​ source and ​one​ receiver. Consider, for example, 
epistemic power. A source of information can have great epistemic power not only in virtue of 
her social identity (i.e., occupying a role society deems valuable or important) but also simply in 
virtue of her ​epistemic reach​: how many individuals in the community will or are likely to 
receive her testimony first-, second-, or third-hand. This latter sense of epistemic power captures 
how chains of information -- ​epistemic paths ​-- propagate through the community. Such paths of 
testimony can be short, as in the dyadic case of a single source transmitting to a single receiver. 
They can also be indefinitely long, as when a source transmits through a string of conduits who 
together manage to convey the information to a receiver.  
How much epistemic reach certain sources have is no doubt relevant to the epistemic 
norms and virtues surrounding testimonial knowledge. For instance, it seems plausible that 
someone with great reach should be more cautious in what they say, compared to someone with 
very limited reach. Likewise, it seems plausible that part of what it takes to embody the virtue of 
3 Broadly, our research follows the workflow outlined in Alfano & Higgins (forthcoming). 
4 We begin by conceptualizing the research question and all variables involved because inadequate, imprecise, and 
ambiguous conceptualization is arguably one of the root causes of the replication crisis currently racking psychology 
(Lurquin & Miyake 2017).  
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intellectual humility is to be disposed to notice gaps in one’s testimonial network and make 
efforts to fill them, when those gaps are sufficiently large and important enough. 
Questions of epistemic power go beyond epistemic sources.  Epistemic receivers could 
also be well-placed in a very direct way, if they receive testimony from a very large number of 
sources. However, most real epistemic communities are much sparser. In such communities, an 
agent might be a well-placed receiver, not due to a large number of sources, but simply in virtue 
of the fact that a large number of messages in the community eventually make their way to her -- 
sometimes through short epistemic paths and sometimes through much longer ones.  
These points, about the relation between epistemic power, on the one hand, and the 
source and receiver roles, on the other hand, hold ​mutatis mutandis​ for other epistemic 
phenomena, such as trust and reliability.  Thus, there are macro-level influences that are 5
operative in large-scale epistemic communities that are not operative in a dyadic community. 
Attending to these phenomena, using the concepts and distinctions discussed here, makes it 
possible and worthwhile to explore what Alfano (2016) calls the ​topology​ of communities of 
epistemic trust, both from a normative and from a descriptive point of view. 
In order to explore these macro-level dimensions of the testifies-to relation, it is 
paramount to investigate larger, more structured epistemic communities than have typically been 
studied by social epistemologists. Hence, in this paper we model a non-ideal epistemic 
community. Such a model will help to inform us how we should think about macro-level aspects 
of epistemic trust and power, as well as what makes for a good source or receiver of information 
in an interconnected epistemic community.  
2.2 Testimonial communities as directed networks 
As discussed above, the designation of nodes, edges, edge weights, and network directedness are 
central determinations to make when modeling a target phenomenon as a network, such as an 
epistemic community, as a network.  In our testimonial network the nodes represent epistemic 6
sources and receivers of testimony. The edges represent the ​testifies-to​ relation discussed above. 
However, in order to focus on the macro-level structural influences of testimonial networks we 
abstract away any details of trust or weighted reliability in the testifies-to relation. Thus, the 
weight of edges simply represents the number of messages from a source to a receiver. By first 
analyzing these simple structural relations, we will then be able to more clearly see how trust and 
reliability could function within macro-level structures. 
Next, we need to determine whether a testimonial epistemic community is best modeled 
as a directed or undirected network. The information-sharing network models deployed in the 
philosophy of science are largely undirected models (Holman and Bruner 2015; Rosenstock et al. 
2016; Zollman 2007, 2010). The use case for these models is how information is shared within a 
scientific community and how groups of researchers converge on a single plan of action, such as 
prescribing one medication over another. The acting assumption in these models is that 
testimonial exchanges are ​symmetric​: agents jointly trade information with each other.  It is fair 7
5 See Alfano & Huijts (forthcoming) for a discussion on how trust manifests in non-dyadic epistemic networks. 
6 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. For example, dynamic network-models that involve agent-based 
simulation include node parameters that simulate agent decisions that update throughout the simulated run. For an 
information sharing example see Holman and Bruner (2015), Rosenstock et al. (2016), and Zollman (2007, 2010).  
7 Holman and Bruner (2015) deploy a model where the testifying relationship is not entirely symmetric. In their 
agent-based model they simulate that researchers tend to rely on and trust some sources more than others. However, 
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to say that in these models edges represent a testifies-​with​ relation. For any pair of connected 
agents, each agent provides information to, and receives information from, the other. In contrast, 
if we consider a testimonial exchange between an expert and a non-expert, symmetry can no 
longer be presumed. In many cases, the non-expert does not offer testimony in exchange with the 
expert; the non-expert is merely a receiver of testimony. Thus, when modeling testimonial 
networks outside of an idealized community of near-peer researchers, where agents have 
different epistemic goals and projects, it is important to take into account the directional nature 
of the the testifies-​to​ relation. That said, the same individual can take on the source role as well 
as the receiver role in the larger community. However, each testifies-to relation remains an 
asymmetrical case of sharing information ​to ​someone who is presumed to lack information, and 
where the receiver is not presumed to give information back in response.  
2.3 (Page)Ranking sources and receivers 
Our main goal in this paper is not simply to model a real epistemic community, but to explore 
how we can identify which individuals in the network are good sources of information by virtue 
of the surrounding network that links to (or shares) that information, and which individuals in the 
network are well-informed by virtue of their position and the positions of their sources. 
PageRank offers a plausible approach.  
Recall that PageRank was implemented in web-search technologies to help identify 
sources that are likely to have epistemic importance. Roughly, a webpage’s PageRank is the 
probability that someone randomly clicking through webpages will end up visiting that page 
(Brin & Page 1998). The ranking is not based solely on the number of pages that link to it, but 
also includes the importance of the pages that link to it. Pages with several links “pass on” some 
of the value of those links to the pages they link to. One perhaps-counterintuitive result of this 
approach is that some pages with considerably fewer incoming links can be ranked higher than a 
page with far more links. The rationale is that if important webpages are linking to something, 
that in itself is an important indicator if the page’s merit. For example, if ​The​ ​New York Times 
were to link to another source in its reporting, then that source may have a higher PageRank, 
even if it is a more obscure page. However, despite the page’s obscurity, it does ground the 
Times​ reporting, and thus the content of the page should seem to weigh heavier than the 
second-hand reporting from the ​Times​. The same intuitions motivate testimonial exchanges. 
Sources of testimony that attract more trust are more likely sharing epistemically useful 
information, which is a strong though defeasible reason to give more weight to those sources. 
Thus, it seems that PageRank houses the theoretical tools not only to track epistemic importance 
on the web, but also to exploit the wisdom of crowds in testimonial networks (Masterton et al. 
2016, 2017).  
 Furthermore, there are practical benefits to applying link-based rankings to testimonial 
networks. Algorithms can be designed to increase the epistemic position of those in online 
testimonial communities, as they have in optimizing search queries. Thus, the time is ripe to ask 
whether PageRank actually lives up to its wisdom-of-crowds promise in non-ideal testimonial 
networks. In order to test this, we conducted two case studies consisting of real epistemic 
communities found on Twitter.  
they model this through the dynamics of the agent-based system on how nodes update, not through introducing 




3. Study 1 
In order to test the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis in a non-ideal network, we needed to identify 
accessible data sources that we expect to contain a large number of epistemic agents acting as 
sources and receivers, potentially mediated by conduits. One of the largest social epistemic 
networks currently in existence is Twitter. Although the quality of discourse on this platform 
varies greatly, it provides a suitable source for exploring whether PageRank lives up to its 
promise of delivering the wisdom of crowds for real testimonial communities.  
On the Twitter platform, users have the ability to compose new tweets of up to 280 
characters; they also can see the tweets published by other users and can interact with these by 
“liking” them, retweeting them, or replying to them. The retweeting functionality, which is 
similar to functionalities on other platforms (e.g., “sharing” on Facebook) is especially 
interesting for our purposes. It enables a user to pass along content (and potentially whatever 
knowledge could be acquired from that content), making them a conduit. It also indicates 
(heuristically) that the person read the testimony and thought it was worth sharing. This suggests 
the testimony was a source of information for the retweeter, whether or not they ultimately 
accepted that testimony as true.  
When user A gets retweeted by user B, that establishes a link ​out​ from A (and, by the 
same token, a link ​in​ to B). The number of links out from a given node is that node’s out-degree; 
the number of links in to a given node is that node’s in-degree. PageRankIn and PageRankOut 
are calculated using the PageRank algorithm (Brin & Page 1998) with ​d​=0.85 on the network of 
users and links, and the reverse of this network respectively. We use ​high​ ​PageRankOut​ as a 
heuristic for identifying a good epistemic ​source​; high PageRankOut indicates that the user’s 
tweets tend to be retweeted to a wide audience. We use ​high PageRankIn​ as a heuristic for 
identifying well-placed epistemic ​receivers​; high PageRankIn indicates that the user tends to 
retweet more messages, thus drawing on a wide number of sources. Table 1 shows the epistemic 
concepts to be modeled along with their operationalizations. 
 
Table 1: definitions and operationalizations of key terms. 
Concepts Network-Definitions Formal Parameters 
well-positioned 
epistemic source 
a node that transmits new information into the 
network 
high PageRankOut  
well-positioned 
epistemic receiver 
a node that receives information propagated 
from elsewhere in the network 
high PageRankIn  
epistemic path a path through from a source through zero or 
more conduits to a receiver 
chain of retweets 
between nodes 
epistemic geodesic the shortest epistemic path between a pair of 
nodes 
shortest chain of 
retweets between nodes 
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3.1 ​Data collection 
We conducted a search query on the Twitter stream API that ran from March 5, 2017 to March 
11, 2017. We explain how this is done below and provide our code in an appendix. We were 
interested in seeing a discussion surrounding a controversial topic that would include information 
that varied along the dimensions of both quality and quantity. For this purpose, we chose to look 
at discussions of vaccine safety. We searched for tweets that used hashtags and text strings, such 
as #vaxxed, #vaccineswork, #vaccinesafety, ‘vaccine’, and ‘antivax’. In addition we collected 
tweets that were from, to, or mentioned specific users, such as @realnaturalnews and 
@CDCgov. These users were identified inductively: researchers searched for sources on both 
sides of the debate that were prominently involved in ongoing discussions of vaccine safety, then 
added those sources to a list. The full search query can be found in the appendix. The search 
resulted in 60,230 tweets from 36,390 users.  
3.2 ​Cleaning and processing the data 
Data collected through the Twitter API contains several data points about each tweet, including 
the text of a tweet, whether it is a retweet or reply, how many likes and followers the user has, 
and sometimes the geographic location the tweet was made from, among (many) other data 
points. As discussed above, a retweet network is best-suited to our research questions. 
Almost all the 36,390 accounts in our raw dataset are minimally connected to the 
discourse on vaccine safety. Thus, we proceed by isolating the core of the network in order to 
avoid imposing artificial boundaries, aid in network visualization, and analyze those who 
participate in ongoing engagement and discussion. Starting with the raw data, we repeatedly 
remove nodes (accounts) if they are only minimally connected. A node counts as minimally 
connected if the sum of its in-degree and out-degree is 0 or 1. In other words, we eliminate users 
who published one vaccine-related tweet that was retweeted exactly 0 or 1 times (and didn’t 
retweet any other tweets about vaccines), as well as users who retweeted exactly 0 or 1 tweets 
about vaccine safety (and didn’t publish any tweets about vaccines that were retweeted by 
others). We repeat this process in stages until zero accounts are removed in a stage, indicating 
that the core of the network is all that remains.  
All actors removed from the original network were never engaged in the conversations of 
the core directly. They propagated the conversation of the core outwards in the unfiltered 
network, or supplied input to the core via proxy. After removing these actors, we have multiple 
networks consisting of only the important actors. We designate the largest of these networks as 
our core network. This process filtered out the vast majority of accounts from the raw data, 
leaving a core network of just 240 nodes.  
3.3 ​Analysis 
Our methodology for interpreting a network proceeds along two tracks. The first track is through 
inferences from the mathematical properties of the network. The second track, visualization, is 
discussed in the next section.  
The measures used to analyze networks are derived from the relational properties of 
nodes. As we explained above, the basic relational property is a node’s ​degree​, or the number of 
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other nodes it is connected to. In directed networks, we can distinguish between a node’s 
in-degree​ (the number of edges that point to it) and its ​out-degree​ (the number of edges that 
point from it). In our retweet network on vaccine safety a node with a high out-degree is one that 
has been retweeted often. A node with a high in-degree retweets others often. Degree is a local 
property of nodes: a node with three connections could exist at the periphery of a network or 
function as a significant bridge or bottleneck in the network, depending on how the rest of the 
network is structured. In order to better understand the roles played by different nodes, it’s 
therefore helpful to employ more holistic properties. As mentioned above, for this purpose we 
use PageRankOut and PageRankIn because they informatively summarize holistic information. 
As an initial check on the viability of our API query, two of the authors independently 
hand-coded random samples of tweets both from the unfiltered network (300 tweets) and from 
the core network (300 tweets). 28.8% of the tweets in the unfiltered network were deemed 
irrelevant, whereas only 7% of tweets in the core network were deemed irrelevant. Many of the 
irrelevant tweets were by (or retweets of, replies to, or mentions of) the specific accounts 
mentioned in section 3.1 above. For this reason, in the second case study, we did not 
automatically include these accounts in our API query. 
In addition, to further establish the viability of our approach, we use latent dirichlet 
allocation (LDA -- Blei et al 2003) topic modelling on the full collection of tweets, and define 
C​(​u,v​) as the union of the most dominant topic per tweet that is retweeting along edge (​u,v​). The 
LDA topic model reveals three main kinds of tweets: a predominately pro-vaccination set of 
tweets, a predominantly anti-vaccination set of tweets, and a set that represents alternative 
perspectives. The latter set includes topics surrounding alternative medicine and 
anti-establishment politics, among others. We surmise that this third group was responsible for 
the higher proportion of irrelevant tweets in the unfiltered network as compared to the core 
network. There were also more nuanced topic trends present in the data. For example, within the 
pro-vaccination tweets some users present a positive case for societal vaccination, while others 
present a negative argument against the viewpoints of those who are anti-vaccination (in other 
words, they are anti-anti-vaccination).  
Next, because the number of nodes in the core network was of a manageable size, we 
labeled them by hand rather than using automated natural language processing. In line with the 
semantic broad topics identified by LDA, three independent coders labeled each of the nodes of 
the core network as being either pro-vaccine, con-vaccine, or neutral. No codebook was used; 
instead, the coders simply read with an eye to the opinions expressed in the tweets and any urls 
they linked to. We observed adequate interrater reliability (Fleiss’s κ = .734, ​z​ = 29.7, ​p​ < .001). 
The main source of disagreement was a set of accounts that could not easily be classified as 
pro-vaccine, con-vaccine, or neutral. Two researchers reviewed cases of disagreement and 
designated 18 accounts as ​irrelevant​; these accounts were removed from the core network, 
leaving 185 nodes. The average out-degree, in-degree, PageRankOut, and PageRankIn of nodes 
in each of the three camps is summarized in Table 2. For more detailed plots of the data, we refer 
to Figure 7 in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 2: mean degree and PageRank properties of pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine 
accounts. 
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 n out-degree in-degree PageRankOut PageRankIn 
pro-vaccine 91 2.49 2.46 10.4*(10​-6​) 7.98*(10​-6​) 
neutral 1 1 1 4.35*(10​-6​) 4.28*(10​-6​) 
con-vaccine 93 8.69 8.73 16.9*(10​-6​) 13.5*(10​-6​) 
 
The number of pro- and con-vaccine accounts in the core of the network is nearly identical, and 
there is just one neutral account. The average out-degree, in-degree, and PageRankOut of 
con-vaccine accounts is higher, whereas the average pro-vaccine PageRankIn is higher. Because 
there are so few neutral accounts, we exclude them from significance testing. Kruskal-Wallis 
tests reveals that differences in out-degree (𝜒​2​ = 16.17, df = 1, ​p​ = .001), in-degree (𝜒​2​ = 7.96, df 
= 1, ​p​ = .046), and PageRankOut (𝜒​2​ = 9.64, df = 1, ​p​ = .02) are significant, whereas differences 
in PageRankIn are not (𝜒 ​2​ = 1.80, df = 1, ​p​ = .62). Together, these results suggest that there are 
very few neutral accounts tweeting about vaccine safety, and that the reach (out-degree & 
PageRankOut) of con-vaccine accounts is greater. Regarding receptivity (in-degree & 
PageRankIn), the results are mixed: the con-vaccine community has significantly greater 
in-degree but statistically indistinguishable PageRankIn. 
3.4 ​Visualization 
In principle, everything that can be learned from a visualization could also be learned by 
analyzing the bare mathematics of the network itself. However, given the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of human cognition and perception, it is sometimes (though by no means always) 
advantageous to employ visualizations.  This is especially acute for analyzing nodes ranked by 8
PageRank or degree. Importantly, visualization is a tool for analysis and understanding.  
We first plot the network using a simple force-directed layout as implemented in D3.js.  9
This gives the impression of two well-separated communities, one more tightly knit than the 
other, but we should keep in mind that a force-directed layout provides us with no guarantees 
about perceived and actual distance: nodes that are far apart in the visualization may in fact be 
fairly close in the network structure. Moreover, it is difficult to correlate PageRank scores with 
sentiment (being pro- or con-vaccine, etc).  
8 Visualizations can also be misleading, so it’s important to employ best practices as outlined in Munzner (2014). 
9 We used version 4 of D3.js by Mike Bostock. ​http://www.d3js.org​, accessed August 2018. 
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Figure 2: A force-directed layout of the graph. ​​Nodes represent accounts and arrows represent 
retweeting. 
 
We therefore alter the layout and use the node positions to communicate these values. As 
position is the strongest visual variable (Munzner 2014), this allows us to best focus on and 
assess the values of PageRank and sentiment. Below are visualizations of users’ attitudes 
towards vaccination based on the three independent coders, with all 185 accounts in the core 
network represented. Position on the x-axis is determined by averaging the sentiment scores of 
all three raters. We slightly offset these positions horizontally, to get a better sense of the number 
of accounts and a clearer view of the network: the horizontal position within a column is ​not 
indicative of strength of opinion. Position on the y-axis represents an account’s reach 
(PageRankOut, Figure 3) or receptivity (PageRankIn, Figure 4). The properties of the most 





Figure 3: Active pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine Twitter accounts ranked by 
PageRankOut. ​​Nodes represent accounts and arrows represent retweeting. We treat accounts as 
sources to the extent that they have high PageRankOut. The most prominent con-vaccine and 
pro-vaccine accounts are, respectively, @[REDACTED1] and @[REDACTED2].  10
 
 
10 Following the ethical considerations outlined in ​(Townsend and Wallace 2016), we keep any non-public figure 
anonymous where possible. In this context, public figures are those who either have been verified by Twitter (i.e., 
have a blue check) or have a wikipedia entry about them. 
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Figure 4: Active pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine Twitter accounts ranked by 
PageRankIn. ​​Nodes represent accounts and arrows represent retweeting. We treat accounts as 
receivers to the extent that they have high PageRankIn. The most prominent con-vaccine and 
pro-vaccine accounts are, respectively, @[REDACTED3] and @[REDACTED4]. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the reach and receptivity of both the pro-vaccine and 
con-vaccine camps. Communication between the camps is rare, and there are just a handful of 
neutral participants. To test this more formally, we use a ​homophily ​test, following the exposition 
of Easley and Kleinberg (2010). The main idea is to compare the fraction of cross-camp links to 
the expected fraction of such links if links were chosen randomly. To do so, let ​p ​denote the 
fraction of nodes in one camp, and ​q = ​1​ - p​ the fraction of nodes that are not in this camp. A 
random link has probability ​p​2​ of being within the considered camp, ​q​2​ ​of being fully outside the 
camp, and 2​pq​ of being between a node in the considered camp and one outside of it. As such, 
we can assess the homophily of the network by comparing the actual cross-camp links to this 
threshold. Following Meulemans and Schulz (2015), we can extend this to a ​degree of 
homophily​, defined as 1​ - x/​(4​pq​)​ ​if ​x < ​2​pq​ and (1 ​- x​)/(2 - 4​pq​) otherwise, where ​x​ is the actual 
fraction of cross-camp links. The degree of homophily is 0 if there are only cross-camp links, 0.5 
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if there is no homophily at all, and 1 is there is a strong indication of homophily. We assess the 
homophily of each camp by lumping together the other two camps to assess the strength of 
preference of communicating within the camp to communicating between camps. For example, 
when considering the pro-vaccine camp, we treat both con-vaccine and neutral accounts as a 
single distinct camp. The homophily of the pro- and con-vaccine camps are 0.993 and 0.995 
respectively, indicating a strong bias towards retweeting information from accounts that have the 
same viewpoint. 
In addition, while the number of members in each camp is roughly equivalent, the 
communication pattern in the con-vaccine camp shows greater density, whereas the pro-vaccine 
community is more diffuse. This corroborates our analysis in the previous section, which showed 
higher PageRankOut and PageRankIn of accounts in the con-vaccine community. What accounts 
for this difference? One possibility is that con-vaccine accounts are solely or primarily focused 
on this one topic (as commentators, activists, etc.), whereas the pro-vaccine accounts are 
occasional commentators who also engage with a range of other topics. We explore this 
hypothesis in more detail in section 5 below. 
3.5 ​Discussion  
This study suggests that network analysis and visualization can be used to better 
understand social epistemic communities. We have identified two important formal roles that 
epistemic agents can have in a community: sources and receivers. We then operationalized these 
roles and identified those who are seen as good sources of information and those who are active 
receivers. These are the first steps in assessing the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis. Our tentative 
conclusion is that high PageRankOut is epistemically bivalent. Given the scientific consensus on 
vaccine safety, we operated on the heuristic that the pro-vaccine accounts are more likely to offer 
reliable testimony compared to anti-vaccine accounts. Our observations, from taking a close look 
at various accounts, stayed true to this heuristic. Nodes with high PageRankOut that were labeled 
pro-vaccine seem to offer reliable, expert testimony to others in their community. For example, 
Redacted2 is a medical doctor and the president of a prominent medical association. However, 
nodes labeled as anti-vaccine with high PageRankOut (including the node with by far the highest 
PageRankOut) spread misinformation and disinformation. The formal properties of the network 
under discussion here do not make it possible to distinguish between these. Likewise, we suggest 
that high PageRankIn is epistemically bivalent. Again after taking a close look at various 
accounts we saw that some nodes with high PageRankIn seem to be well-positioned to learn that 
vaccines are generally safe, but others are liable to end up more misinformed or disinformed than 
they would have been if they simply disconnected from the testimonial network entirely. And as 
with the sources, the formal properties of the network under discussion here do not make it 
possible to distinguish between these cases. If this is right, then the wisdom-of-crowds 
hypothesis needs to be significantly curtailed. Using PageRankOut as a heuristic to identify 
trustworthy sources does not succeed in this network. Using PageRankIn as a heuristic to 
identify well-informed receivers does not succeed in this network. In Study 2, we replicate this 




4. Study 2 
Study 1 suggested that an unvarnished version of the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis is false. Of 
course, that was based on one week’s discussion of vaccine safety in English on Twitter. It 
would be rash to generalize from just a single case. To shed further light on this topic, we 
conducted a second study with a new and larger data set.  
 
4.1 ​Data collection 
As in Study 1, we conducted a search query on the Twitter stream API. This search ran from 
March 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018. These dates were selected to ensure that any seasonal effects 
on our data would be minimal, and to expand the amount of data under analysis by a factor of 
approximately 4. We searched for tweets that used the same hashtags and text strings as in Study 
1. These include such hashtags and text strings as #vaxxed, #vaccineswork, #vaccinesafety, 
‘vaccine’, and ‘antivax’. However, we did not automatically include all tweets from specific 
accounts because these seemed to be a source of noise in Study 1. The full search query can be 
found in the appendix. The search resulted in 167,521 tweets from 156,932 users.  
4.2 ​Cleaning and processing the data 
Almost all the 156,932 accounts in our raw dataset are minimally connected to the discourse on 
vaccine safety. Thus, we again isolate the core of the network by repeatedly removing nodes 
(accounts) if they are only minimally connected. A node counts as minimally connected if the 
sum of its in-degree and out-degree is 0 or 1. We repeat this process in stages until zero accounts 
are removed in a stage, indicating that the core of the network is all that remains. After removing 
these actors, we again designate the largest remaining network as our core network. This process 
filters out the vast majority of accounts from the raw data, leaving a core network of 897 nodes.  
4.3 ​Analysis 
Two of the authors independently hand-coded random samples of tweets both from the unfiltered 
network (300 tweets) and from the core network (300 tweets). 12.8% of the tweets in the 
unfiltered network were deemed irrelevant, whereas only 1.8% of tweets in the core network 
were deemed irrelevant.  This indicates that ceasing to include all tweets from specific accounts 11
greatly reduced the amount of noise in the data, and further corroborates our decision to focus 
the analysis on the core network rather than the unfiltered network. 
Next, we assigned nodes to categories, as in Study 1. Some of the nodes from the core 
network of Study 1 were also part of the core network in Study 2. We did not re-label these 
nodes; instead, we carried over their labels from Study 1. For all 824 new nodes in the core 
network, two independent coders labeled each of the nodes of the core network as being either 
pro-vaccine, con-vaccine, neutral, mixed, or irrelevant. We observed adequate interrater 
reliability (Fleiss’s κ = .811, z = 26.4, ​p​ < .001). The two labelers then reviewed cases of 
disagreement and designated a few accounts as ​irrelevant​; these accounts were removed from the 
11 We further note that several of the tweets in the core network were in French, Italian, or Japanese. They ended up 
in our network primarily because they also included one or more of the hashtags in our API query. Further 
investigation may benefit from a multi-language approach. 
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network before calculating the core, leaving 888 nodes in the core network. The average 
out-degree, in-degree, PageRankOut, and PageRankIn of nodes in each of the four camps is 
summarized in Table 3. For more detailed plots of the data, we refer to Figure 7 in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 3: mean degree and PageRank properties of pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine 
accounts. 
 n out-degree in-degree PageRankOut PageRankIn 
pro-vaccine 549 5.82 5.74 2.98*(10​-6​) 1.71*(10​-6​) 
neutral 3 1.67 3.00 1.64*(10​-6​) 2.02*(10​-6​) 
mixed 9 1.33 1.33 1.78*(10​-6​) 1.51*(10​-6​) 
con-vaccine 327 17.42 17.52 5.74*(10​-6​) 2.31*(10​-6​) 
 
As before, the number of neutral (and mixed) accounts in the core of the network is very small.  12
Unlike Study 1, however, Study 2 suggests that there are nearly twice as many pro-vaccine 
accounts as con-vaccine accounts in the core of the network. The two researchers who labeled 
the data noted a large number of pro-vaccine accounts that seemed to represent pediatricians and 
other types of physicians (as indicated by their account names). It is unclear whether Study 1 
simply missed tweets from such accounts or whether instead an active campaign by pediatricians 
and other doctors is distinctive of the year 2018. Because there are so few neutral and mixed 
accounts, we exclude them from significance testing. Kruskal-Wallis tests reveals that 
differences in out-degree (𝜒​2​ = 19.67, df = 1, ​p​ = .0002), in-degree (𝜒​2​ = 41.99, df = 1, ​p​ < .0001), 
PageRankOut (𝜒 ​2​ = 12.95, df = 1, ​p ​= .005) and PageRankIn (𝜒​2​ = 11.80, df = 1, ​p​ = .008) are all 
significant. Together, these results suggest that there are very few neutral or mixed accounts 
tweeting about vaccine safety, and that both the reach (out-degree & PageRankOut) and the 
receptivity (in-degree & PageRankIn) of con-vaccine accounts is greater. It’s noteworthy that 
these differences obtain despite the fact that there are almost twice as many pro-vaccine accounts 
in the core network. This is in keeping with the findings of Radzikowski et al. (2016), who 
studied Twitter discussions during a measles outbreak in February 2015. Their data “indicated 
that a bottom-up campaign [...] far outweighed the presence of official sources such as the 
top-down efforts of CDC and WHO.” Our findings go further: even when individual 
pediatricians and doctors get involved in debates over vaccine safety (recall that pro-vaccine 
accounts far outnumber con-vaccine accounts in the core network), their reach and receptivity do 
not match the reach and receptivity of the con-vaccine accounts. 
4.4 ​Visualization 
As before, we also visualize the data to aid in interpretation. These visualizations are based on 
the core network, with 888 accounts represented. Position on the x-axis is determined by 
12 It is not clear whether distinguishing neutral from mixed views in this way is worth the effort when analyzing 
testimonial networks about vaccine safety. Perhaps in other testimonial networks on other topics, it would be so.  
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sentiment, with neutral and mixed accounts grouped together for convenience; again, we offset 
these horizontally for legibility but remind the reader that this offset within a column carries no 
meaning. Position on the y-axis represents each account’s reach (PageRankOut, Figure 4) or 
receptivity (PageRankIn, Figure 5). We again see that communication between the camps is rare. 
We compute the degree of homophily and observe that with 0.988 and 0.983 for the pro- and 
con-vaccine camps, respectively, these values remain very high (recall that the maximum 





Figure 5: Active pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine Twitter accounts ranked by 
PageRankOut. ​​Nodes represent accounts and arrows represent retweeting. We treat accounts as 
sources to the extent that they have high PageRankOut. The most prominent con-vaccine and 









Figure 6: Active pro-vaccine, neutral, and con-vaccine Twitter accounts ranked by 
PageRankIn. ​​Nodes represent accounts and arrows represent retweeting. We treat accounts as 
receivers to the extent that they have high PageRankIn. The most prominent con-vaccine, 
neutral, and pro-vaccine accounts are, respectively, @[REDACTED3], @[REDACTED6], and 
@[REDACTED7]. 
 
In addition, while there are more members of the pro-vaccine camp, the communication pattern 
in the con-vaccine camp shows greater density, whereas the pro-vaccine community is more 
diffuse. This corroborates our analysis in the previous section and in Study 1, which showed 
higher PageRankOut and PageRankIn of accounts in the con-vaccine community. In section 5, 
we return to this finding. 
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4.5 ​Discussion 
This study once again suggests that network analysis and visualization can be used to better 
understand social epistemic communities. As in Study 1, the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis is not 
borne out by our data and analyses. Once again, it appears that high PageRankOut is 
epistemically bivalent. After taking a close look at various accounts in the network, we found 
that some nodes with high PageRankOut seem to offer reliable, expert testimony to others in 
their community. However, other nodes with high PageRankOut (including the node with by far 
the highest PageRankOut) spread misinformation and disinformation. In fact, the same 
misinformation account that had the highest PageRankOut in our first study, continued to have 
the highest PageRankOut. The formal properties of the network under discussion here do not 
make it possible to distinguish between these. Likewise, high PageRankIn is again epistemically 
bivalent. We found that some nodes with high PageRankIn seem to be well-positioned to learn 
that vaccines are generally safe, but others are liable to end up more misinformed or disinformed 
than they would have been if they simply disconnected from the testimonial network entirely. 
For such actors, avoiding testimony altogether would both save them time and improve their 
epistemic position; this may hold more generally in the context of fake news and a polluted 
epistemic ecosystem (Levy 2017). And as with the sources, the formal properties of the network 
under discussion here do not make it possible to distinguish between these cases. In light of this 
replication with a new and larger dataset, the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis needs to be 
significantly curtailed, especially in regards to polarized topics. Using PageRankOut as a 
heuristic to identify trustworthy sources does not work in the sorts of non-ideal epistemic 
networks found in the real world. Using PageRankIn as a heuristic to identify well-informed 
receivers also does not work in the sorts of non-ideal epistemic networks found in the real world.  
 
5. General discussion and directions for future research 
On its own, PageRank does not seem to deliver on the promise of harnessing the wisdom of 
crowds for agents in real testimonial communities. In both of our case studies, the nodes with 
highest PageRankOut were not reliable sources, the nodes with highest PageRankIn were not 
likely to be well-informed, and both PageRankOut and PageRankIn were overall higher in the 
con-vaccine camp. Perhaps some other metric would do better in such an epistemically 
treacherous environment. In this section, we point to two such features that deserve further 
research. 
First, most articulations of the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis require that the crowd be 
structured in a way that preserves sufficient independence among the members of the community 
(Surowiecki 2004). One attractive way to spell out the independence criterion is in terms of the 
distance between the sources that a given receiver relies upon. The metaphors of the “filter 
bubble” and “echo chamber” (Pariser 2011) that are nowadays common in criticisms of public 
discourse on social media suggests a lack of independence. Perhaps if a formal definition of 
relying on multiple independent sources could be developed and operationalized for the study of 
real testimonial networks, it would fare better than PageRank in harnessing the wisdom of 
crowds. 
Second, in this paper we noted that the discourse on vaccine safety is highly polarized 
and partisan. The proportion of discussants whose views could plausibly be considered neutral or 
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mixed was very low. In Study 1, just 1 out of 185 accounts was not partisan. In Study 2, only 12 
out of 888 accounts were not partisan. The cross-talk between the camps was also rare. In Study 
1, the degree of homophily for the pro- and con-vaccines camps were .993 and .995, 
respectively. In Study 2, these values were .988 and .983, respectively, extremely close to the 
maximum of 1.0. This suggests that, in addition to purely structural metrics such as PageRank 
and source independence, assessments of the health of epistemic communities would do well to 
attend to diversity of viewpoint or content.  Indeed, Tafuri et al. (2014) advocate fostering 13
diversity among news media to address anti-vaccine misinformation, and Dubois & Blank (2018) 
argue that citizens with sufficient curiosity operating in a diverse media environment typically 
manage to avoid getting trapped in echo chambers more generally. 
However, measuring and improving viewpoint diversity is challenging for several 
reasons. While it is possible to delineate broad topical communities using LDA, as we did in 
Study 1, this is a very coarse way of carving up the space of discussion. It is important to be able 
to assess not just how various camps disagree with each other but also their ​reasons​ for 
disagreeing. In other words, there is not simply diversity in viewpoint regarding diversity in the 
conclusion reached (either pro or anti-vax), but also diversity in the reasons given for a given 
conclusion. Furthermore, when taking a close look at at the profiles of both the pro-vaccine and 
con-vaccine accounts with highest PageRankOut and PageRankIn, we found that the most 
prominent con-vaccine accounts in our data seem to have a single-minded focus on vaccines. We 
observed that the most prominent sources on the pro-vaccine side of the controversy were 
medical professionals and the most prominent receivers on this side of the controversy were 
non-medical accounts that engaged in a wide range of topics. By contrast, the most prominent 
sources on the con-vaccine side of the controversy include vaccination-related information in 
their account descriptions, along with references to homeopathy and alternative medicine. The 
most prominent receivers on this side of the controversy seem to be controlled by activists who 
believe that their children have been harmed by vaccination. These accounts are also more 
single-minded in their topic focus, with the vast majority of content referring directly or 
tangentially to vaccine safety, compared to the pro-vaccine accounts. Plausibly, this may lead 
them to seek out, attend to, interpret, and remember information about vaccine safety that makes 
them epistemically worse off. This suggests that beyond viewpoint- and reasons-diversity 
between​ individuals and groups, it may be important to attend to diversity of interests ​within 
individuals and groups. Measuring these three types of diversity (viewpoint-, interest-, and 
reasons-) is a tall order. 
Moreover, there are at least two important caveats regarding the epistemic value of 
diversity that make harnessing a diversity metric in the wisdom of crowds even more 
challenging. First, regarding interest-diversity: we are well aware that activists are often 
criticized for lacking diversity in their interests or being obsessed by an ​idée fixe​. We do not 
want to unthinkingly condemn all activism. Moreover, presumably, the vaccine skeptics in our 
data see themselves as being activists in exactly this way. This makes interest-diversity an 
ambivalent epistemic heuristic. 
Second, in the case of vaccine safety, scientific evidence supports one side of the 
controversy. In such conditions, neutrality, ambivalence, or conciliation is not necessarily a 
virtue and may be a vice. As mentioned above, Levy (2017) argues that avoiding testimony is the 
13 It is also worth investigating how PageRank fares in non-ideal testimonial networks involving non-controversial 
topics that have a lower degree of homophily. 
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correct response in these sorts of cases. However, inter-camp discussion does not necessarily 
require partisans to change their views, reduce their confidence, or conciliate epistemically in 
some other way. As John Stuart Mill (1859 / 1989) argued in chapter two of ​On Liberty​, there is 
much to be said for the free expression of opinions, whether they are true, false, or partially true. 
According to Mill, false views are epistemically defensible because expressing false opinions 
leads to debate, which is one of our best methods for arriving at the truth on a given question. 
Mill famously indicts those who are unwilling to defend in open debate (what they take to be) 
the truth as being at risk of having their knowledge demoted to “dead dogma” and “phrases 
retained by rote.” Furthermore, when the topic under discussion is complex -- as is typically the 
case in the political, moral, and medical domains -- it often happens that any given person’s 
opinion contains some truth and some falsehood. For instance, health experts do not recommend 
that all populations receive all vaccines as early as possible; the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) 
vaccine is generally not recommended for infants younger than twelve months.  In complex 14
cases, universal generalizations (e.g., “All vaccines are safe for all populations”) are almost 
always false. Debate, when it plays out well, helps to refine the proposition under discussion 
until it becomes epistemically acceptable.  
That said, there are limits to the epistemic value of debate. In particular, the rise of 
trolling as a form of engagement means that many invitations to debate are not made in good 
faith. By good faith we mean, roughly, that one is willing to change their views in light of some 
conceivable evidence or argument that one’s opponent might offer. Furthermore, it’s important 
to recognize that engaging in debate often brings with it significant opportunity costs in terms of 
time, effort, and emotional engagement. Incessant, bad-faith invitations to engage in debate are a 
well-known tactic of trolls called ‘sea lioning’ (Poland 2016, p. 145). Trolls who engage in sea 
lioning might seem to have John Stuart Mill on their side: after all, can’t they accuse their 
would-be opponents of adhering to “dead dogma”? On both this question and the question of 
interest-diversity, simple-minded maximization heuristics (​as many interests as possible! as 
many viewpoints as possible! as much debate as possible!​) are hopeless.  
Thus, much needs to be done on how to establish a diversity of viewpoint metric that can 
harness the wisdom of crowds that can balance issues of when to cut off testimony and debate 
and when to engage in order to maintain and secure one’s epistemic position. Articulating and 
defending operationalizable heuristics is a massive task that will require the expertise and input 
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Figure 7: Violin plots to show the distribution of nodes in terms of in- and outdegree, and 
PageRankIn and -Out for both studies.  
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Twitter Search Query for Study 1: 
 
text: vax, vaxxed, vaccine, vaxsafety, vaccineswork, vaccinesafety, vaccinesrevealed, 
novax, antivax, vaccination, vaccinations, immunization 
 
hashtags: #vax, #vaxxed, #vaccine, #vaxsafety, #vaccineswork, #vaccinesafety,  
#vaccinesrevealed, #novax, #antivax, #vaccination, #vaccinations 
 
mentions: @CDCgov, @drwakefield, @realnaturalnews, @drpanmd, @conservabotia,  
@WHO, @HHSGov, @DrRandPaul, @MicheleBachmann, @kwakzalverij, 
@rivm, @gezondheidsraad, @RolandPierik, @Gert_van_Dijk, @nvkp_nl, 
@VaccinatieRaad, @AnthonySc6, @LotusOak, @jelani9 
 
from: @CDCgov, @drwakefield, @realnaturalnews, @drpanmd, @conservabotia,  
@WHO, @HHSGov, @DrRandPaul, @MicheleBachmann, @kwakzalverij, 
@rivm, @gezondheidsraad, @RolandPierik, @Gert_van_Dijk, @nvkp_nl, 
@VaccinatieRaad, @AnthonySc6, @LotusOak, @jelani9 
 
to: @CDCgov, @drwakefield, @realnaturalnews, @drpanmd, @conservabotia,  
@WHO, @HHSGov, @DrRandPaul, @MicheleBachmann, @kwakzalverij, 
@rivm, @gezondheidsraad, @RolandPierik, @Gert_van_Dijk, @nvkp_nl, 
@VaccinatieRaad, @AnthonySc6, @LotusOak, @jelani9 
 
exclude: @realdonaldtrump, @RandPaul 
 
 
Twitter Search Query for Study 2: 
 
text: vax, vaxxed, vaccine, vaccination, vaccinations, vaxsafety, vax saftey,  
vaccineswork, vaccines work, vaccinesaftey, vaccine saftey, vaccines revealed, 
vaccinesrevealed, novax, no vax, no-vax, antivax, anti-vax, anti vax, 
immunisation, Vaccin, Vaccinaties, vaccinatiezorg, vaccine injury, vax injury, 
vaccinatieschade 
 
hashtags: #vax, #vaxxed, #vaccine, #vaccination, #vaccinations, #vaxsafety, 
#vaccineswork,  
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#vaccinesaftey, #vaccinesrevealed, #novax, #antivax, #immunisation, #Vaccin, 
#Vaccinaties, #vaccinatiezorg, #vaccinatieschade, #nvkp, #rvp, 
#rijksvaccinatieprogramma, #vaccineinjury, #vaxinjury, #anti-vax 
 
Code for Twitter Stream API in python 3: 
# import libraries  
import tweepy  
from tweepy import Stream 





# Set up the Twitter Stream 
class MyListener(StreamListener): 
    def __init__(self, api, file_name_base, file_length): 
        self.tweet_list=[] 
        self.count = 1 
        self.file_name_base = file_name_base 
        self.file_length = file_length 
  
    def on_data(self, data): 
        try: 
            j = json.loads(data) 
            self.tweet_list.append(j) 
            n = len(self.tweet_list) 
  
            if (n % self.file_length == 0): 
                ts = time.time() 
                stamp = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts).strftime('%m%d%H%M%S') 
                file_name = self.file_name_base + stamp + '.json' 
  
                #writes the file of tweets to your computer  
                with open(file_name , 'w') as f: 
                    json.dump(self.tweet_list, f) 
  
                print("Output File", self.count) 
                self.count = self.count + 1 
                self.tweet_list = [] 
            return True 
        except BaseException as e: 
            print("Error on_data:", str(e)) 
        return True 
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    def on_error(self, status): 
        print("Error",status) 




    def __init__(self, access_token, access_token_secret, consumer_key,  
        consumer_secret): 
        self.access_token = access_token 
        self.access_token_secret = access_token_secret 
        self.consumer_key = consumer_key 
        self.consumer_secret = consumer_secret 
 
def mine_tweets(credentials, search_terms, file_name, file_length): 
    auth = tweepy.OAuthHandler(credentials.consumer_key, credentials.consumer_secret) 
    auth.set_access_token(credentials.access_token, credentials.access_token_secret) 
 
    api = tweepy.API(auth) 
    twitter_stream = Stream(auth, MyListener(auth, file_name, file_length)) 
    print("Starting up!") 
 
    while(True): 
        try: 
            twitter_stream.filter(track=search_terms) 
        except: 
            time.sleep(30) 
            print("program restart") 
 
# Input your personal Twitter-keys and Path 
ACCESS_TOKEN = '** input access token' 
ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET = '** input access token secret' 
CONSUMER_KEY = '** input consumer key' 
CONSUMER_SECRET = '** input consumer_secret' 
 
file_name_base = '** input personal path' 
 
#sets how many tweets you want per file. 
file_length = 100 
 
 
#Customize your twitter search query 
text_list = [] 
hashtag_list = [] 
mentions_list = [] 
from_list = [] 
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to_list = [] 
exclude_list =[] 
 








# Start the stream 
credentials = Credentials(ACCESS_TOKEN, ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET, 
    CONSUMER_KEY, CONSUMER_SECRET) 
 
mine_tweets(credentials, full_list, file_name_base, file_length) 
 
